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Meal Reimbursements as an Employee Fringe
Benefit
INTRODUCTION

For years, employers have furnished meals to their employees as
fringe benefits. Alternatively, some employers have provided cash
reimbursements in lieu of meals in kind.) These cash meal allowances have generated two major tax questions: whether these reimbursements should be includible in gross income and whether these
meal allowances are wages subject to withholding for tax purposes.
The Supreme Court recently addressed both of these issues.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service v. Kowalski2 dealt with
the issue of includibility of meal reimbursements in gross income.
Three months later, the Court in CentralIllinois PublicService Co.
v. United Statess considered whether these allowances constitute
wages subject to withholding taxes.
This article will examine the taxability to employees of employers' meal reimbursements.' The discussion will emphasize the effect
of Kowalski and Central Illinois Public Service on the treatment of
meal reimbursements as gross income and wages respectively. Finally, the article will explore the impact of these decisions on fringe
benefits legislation currently under study by Congress.5
THE INCLUSION OF

MEAL REIMBURSEMENTS IN GROSS INCOME

Gross Income
The first step in determining whether meal reimbursements constitute gross income is to define gross income. Section 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code' defines gross income as all income from
1. This situation is very common among state troopers. See text accompanying notes 1324 infra.
2. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
3. 435 U.S. 21 (1978).
4. The required employer-employee relationship was not questioned in the cases examined for this article. The issue of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor is currently the source of much controversy. For discussions of this issue, see Brogan,
Ruling Eases Independent ContractorTest for Owner-Drivers: What Are Implications, 46 J.
TAX. 364 (1977); Frazer & Goldberg, Twenty-four Ways to Protect Independent Contractor
Status of a Client's Workers, 20 TAX. FOR AccouNrrwrNms 260 (1978); Smith, "Independent
Contractor" or "Employee"? That is the Question, 33 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX. 577

(1975).
5. At the present time both Congress and the Treasury Department have formed special
task forces to study and make recommendations on the tax treatment of employee fringe
benefits. See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.
6. Section references are to the United States Internal Revenue Code.
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whatever source derived, unless excluded by law.7 The concept is
measured by the full extent of Congressional taxing powers.' Accordingly, the definition has been held broad enough to include any
economic or financial benefit from any source, conferred on an employee in any form.'
Nonetheless, section 61 has an inherent defect. By defining gross
income in terms of income, the provision fails to state what constitutes income. Thus, uncertainty arises in determining what benefits
will trigger the operation of the statute. 0
Meal Reimbursements before Kowalski
Section 61 has been construed to include cash reimbursements for
meals." Coactively, section 11912 excludes from gross income the
value of meals provided by an employer to an employee if two conditions are met. First, the meals must be furnished for the convenience of the employer. Additionally, they must be furnished on the
employer's business premises. 3 The provision literally applies to
meals furnished in kind. Courts have differed, however, on whether
section 119 covers cash meal reimbursements.
Kowalski focused on the includibility in gross income of meal
reimbursements paid to state troopers. Prior to Kowalski, five cases
had addressed this issue under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code."
7.

I.R.C. § 61 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items;
8. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961); Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426, 432 (1955); Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823, 827 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied 393
U.S. 844 (1968).
9. Ritter v. United States, 393 F.2d 823, 827 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied 393 U.S. 844 (1968).
10. Treasury Department Proposed Regulations on Fringe Benefits, 40 FED. RaG. 41118
(1975). These regulations were subsequently withdrawn by the Treasury Department.
11. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 695 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Morelan,
356 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1966), aff'g 237 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1965); United States v.
Barrett, 321 F.2d 911, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1963).
12. I.R.C. § 119 provides:
There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals
or lodging furnished to him . . . by . . . his employer for the convenience of the
employer, but only if(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business premises of the
employer, or
13. Accord, Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a) (1964), "The value of meals furnished to an employee
by his employer shall be excluded from the employee's gross income if two tests are met: (i)
The meals are furnished on the business premises of the employer, and (ii) the meals are
furnished for the convenience of the employer."
14. These five cases exclude the recent Supreme Court decision in Comm'r v. Kowalski.
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Three' 5 held that meal allowances and reimbursements are excludable from gross income. Each court emphasized the convenience of
the reimbursement system to the state. The other two cases" ruled
that meals must be furnished in kind to be excludable from gross
income.
This apparent split may be explained by noting that the latter
two cases were concluded after the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Correll," while the former three were prior to Correll. The
pre-Correlldecisions reasoned that even if the reimbursement constituted gross income, the amount spent for meals was a deductible
business expense under section 162.11 Hence, expedience compelled
that these reimbursements not be considered gross income.'" In
Correll, however, the Court held that expenditures for meals cannot
be deducted unless the employee is away from home overnight.'"
Thus, by proscribing a deduction with respect to non-overnight
meals, the Court eliminated the pre-Correll application of section
162 as a means of excluding the reimbursement. Wilson v. U.S."1
confirmed the foreclosure of this rationale by ruling that these meal
expenditures are reimbursements for personal expenses. Consequently, they constitute income to the state trooper unless excluded
by another statutory provision." In addition to the elimination of
See notes 15-16 infra.
15. United States v. Keeton, 383 F.2d 429, 430 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Morelan,
356 F.2d 199, 208 (8th Cir. 1966), aff'g 237 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1965); United States v.
Barrett, 321 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1963).
16. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 695 (1st Cir. 1969); Ghastin v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.
264 (1973).
17. 389 U.S. 299 (1967). The court in Correll ruled that expenditures for meals cannot be
deducted unless away from home overnight. Id. at 307.
18. United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d at 208-09 (8th Cir. 1966); Hanson v. Comm'r, 298
F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1962).
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) states, "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including. . . traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodg" A state trooper
ing . . .) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business ....
on patrol was held to be "away from home" within the meaning of this section whether or
not his trips were overnight. Id. at 394. Thus, a trooper could report as gross income any meal
reimbursements paid by the state without any net tax effect, since he could also deduct the
cost of his on-duty meals.
19. See Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969). Technically, § 162 does not
provide an exclusion at all, but allows deductions from gross income for business expenses.
The net tax effect of an exclusion and of a deduction from gross income, though, is the same.
Each lowers taxable income by the amount received or the amount paid respectively. See note
18 supra. Thus, when a taxpayer seeks to avoid tax on a reimbursement the two possible
options might be to exclude the reimbursement, or to deduct the expense, from gross income.
20. 389 U.S. at 303 (1967).
21. 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969).
22. Id. at 695.
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section 162 as a means of exclusion, section 120(a), which allowed
police to exclude up to five dollars a day in meal allowances from
gross income, has been repealed. 3Therefore, the only remaining
statutory provision which a state trooper can use in an attempt to
exclude meal reimbursements from gross income is section 119.24
5
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Kowalski

Background
Kowalski involved the applicability of section 119 to cash meal
reimbursements paid a New Jersey state trooper . 2 The Tax Court
had held that section 119 applied only to meals furnished in kind.2
Accordingly, it followed that the trooper must include in gross income the meal allowance paid to him by the state.8 On appeal, the
Third Circuit reversed, stating that the meal allowance was furnished for the convenience of the employer and was not intended to
be compensatory. 2 The Supreme Court, in reversing the Court of
Appeals, held that section 119 is a comprehensive determinant of
the excludability of meals provided to an employee, and it required
30
this meal reimbursement to be included in gross income.
The major disagreement in Kowalski concerned whether the section 119 exclusion applies to both meals furnished in kind and meals
furnished in cash.3 1 Treasury Regulation 1.119-1(c)(2) parrots the
legislative history32 and attempts to settle this problem, but actually
23. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 26 U.S.C. § 120 (1954) (repealed 1958). Section
120(a) provided:
(a) GE~.NRAL Rutz-Gross income does not include any amount received as a
statutory subsistence allowance by an individual who is employed as a police official ....
(b)

Lnmrr7AoNS-

(1) Amounts to which subsection (a) applies shall not exceed $5 per day.
24. Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694, 695 (1st Cir. 1969).
25. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
26. New Jersey instituted the cash allowance for its state police officers in 1949. Prior to
that time, troopers were provided with mid-shift meals in kind at various meal stations. This
system proved unsatisfictory to the state, since it often required the troopers to leave their
assigned patrol areas unguarded. The cash allowance system permitted troopers to remain
on call in their assigned patrol areas during meal breaks. The meal allowance was paid
biweekly in advance along with the trooper's salary.
27. Kowalski v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 44, 58 (1975).
28. There were six dissenting judges in the Tax Court who argued that the meal allowance
should not be included in the trooper's gross income. 65 T.C. at 68.
29. 544 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1976). The Court of Appeals thus held that the meal allowance
was excludable from gross income.
30. 434 U.S. at 93-94.
31. It is assumed in this analysis that the meal allowance is furnished on the business
premises of Kowalski's employer.
32. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d SEss. 190, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE. CONG. &
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confuses the issue further. 3 The first line of the regulation states,
"The exclusion provided by section 119 applies only to meals and
lodging furnished in kind by an employer to his employee." However, the last sentence reads "Cash allowances for meals or lodging
received by an employee are includible in gross income to the extent
that such allowances constitute compensation.

'34

Thus, the regula-

tion contains an inconsistency. It states that the exclusion applies
only to meals in kind yet addresses the question of cash allowances.
Majority Decision
In requiring state trooper Kowalski to include the cash meal reimbursement in his gross income, the majority explained that section
119 was enacted to replace long standing judicial doctrine.3 5 This
doctrine excluded employment related meal benefits merely by
showing that they were conferred on an employee "for the convenience of the employer. '3 The Court found controlling the legislative
history and Regulation 1.119-1(c)(2) which embodies it. 37 The Sen-

ate report explicitly stated: "In enacting this section, the Congress
was determined to end the confusion as to the tax status of meals
and lodging furnished an employee by his employer. Section 119

applies only to meals or lodging furnished in kind. ' ' 31 Thus, the

Court ruled that meals are excludable from gross income only if (1)
furnished by an employer to an employee; (2) for the convenience
of the employer; (3) on the employer's business premises; (4) inkind; and (5) for substantially noncompensatory reasons."
The fourth condition means that a cash reimbursement for meals
will never fit within the section 119 exclusion. Cash expenditures
fail to qualify despite language in the Senate Report and Regulation
1.119-1(c)(2) which includes cash meal allowances in gross income
to the extent they constitute compensation. Hence, the implication is that all cash allowances constitute compensation and are
AD. NEws 4621, 4825 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1622].
33. See the conflicting interpretations of this regulation in the Tax Court. 65 T.C. at 56,

68.
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(2) (1954).
35. 434 U.S. at 92.
36. Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955); cf. Van Rosen v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 834

(1951).
37. 434 U.S. at 84.

38.
39.

S.REP. No. 1622, supra note 32.
434 U.S. at 84. The Court derived requirements one, two, and three from the language

of section 119. Requirement five is delineated in Regulation 1.119-1(c)(2).

40. See note 32 supra. The Court noted that this sentence "was meant to indicate only
that meal payments otherwise deductible under § 162(a)(2) of the 1954 Code were not affected
by § 119." 434 U.S. at 94-95.
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includible in gross income. 4 '
However, this implication is inconsistent with other court decisions, Treasury Department rulings, and the explicit language of
Regulation 1.119-1(c)(2). As early as 1925, the Court of Claims held
that cash payments to army officers in commutation of quarters did
not constitute gross income.42 Regulation 1.61-2(b) provides that
subsistence allowances to members of the armed forces are excluded
from gross income. Another exception arises from the IRS's long
standing position that "supper money" is excludable from gross
income. 3 In excluding cash supper expenditures, the Service's position conflicts with the Court's judgment that section 119 is comprehensive in character, and requires meals to be furnished in kind.44
Nevertheless, the Court merely stated that it will not presently
determine whether notwithstanding section 119, the supper money
position may be otherwise justified. 5
Minority Position
In response to judgments against taxpayer Kowalski, Judge Sterrett of the Tax Court and Justice Blackmun dissented. Both disagreed with the majority's characterization of section 119 as comprehensive."6 They observed that Congress has long recognized that not
all amounts paid by an employer result in inclusion under section
61.11 Further, the specific Internal Revenue Code exclusions are not
intended to be exhaustive." Consequently, section 119 does not pro41. 434 U.S. at 92.
42. Jones v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 552 (1925).
43. 65 T.C. at 56. The convenience-of-the-employer doctrine has been extended to cash
payments for "supper money," which may be excluded from gross income. The term "supper
money" means a payment by an employer to an employee who voluntarily performs extra
labor after regular business hours. Such a payment, not considered additional compensation
and not charged to the salary account, is viewed as a payment for the convenience of the
employer. For that reason it does not represent taxable income to the employee. This "supper
money" exclusion has not been eliminated by the Internal Revenue Service. 2 C.B. 90 (1920).
44. Overbeck, Fringe Benefits for the Rank and File Employees, 55 TAxES 820 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Overbeck].
45. 434 U.S. at 92 n.28.
46. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
47. 434 U.S. at 98; 65 T.C. at 65.
48. 65 T.C. at 65, citing Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269, 274 (1962) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). There are two categories of benefits that are not includible in gross income. First,
certain items are specifically excluded from gross income by statute. LR.C. § 101 through §
123 excludes benefits such as contributions by employers to accident and health plans, certain
death benefits, amounts received under accident and health plans, and meals and lodging
furnished for the convenience of the employer. If a taxpayer wishes to exclude a benefit from
gross income under one of these exclusions he must comply with the specific requirements of
the applicable statute.
Other fringe benefits have traditionally not been taxed to employees. These include free
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vide the only means for exclusion of these payments from gross
income.
Judge Sterrett pointed out that as a matter of general tax law,
meals provided by an employer, whether in kind or in cash, should
be excluded from gross income when they are furnished for the
employer's convenience and are not compensatory." Further, Justice Blackmun emphasized that a literal reading of section 119
draws no distinction between meals in kind and meals in cash. 0
Viewing the language of section 119 against a background of the
relevant legislative history and regulations demonstrates that the
inclusion of cash payments in gross income is questionable. 5
The dissent's approach may substantially eliminate the restrictions that Congress imposed under section 119.52 The legislative
history indicates that section 119 was intended as a replacement for
prior law and as a comprehensive standard for determining exclusions from gross income.53 In addition, the first sentence of Regulation 1.119-1(c)(2) restricts the section 119 exclusion to meals furnished in kind. Hence, these authorities tend to negate the possibility of a class of cash meal payments which may be excluded from
gross income.54
Alternative Approach to Meal Reimbursements
In some situations meal reimbursements should be excludable
under section 119. This conclusion is founded on final comments in
passes to airline employees, auto salesmen who have personal use of a demonstrator model,
college professors whose children get free or reduced tuition, executive parking spaces and
unusually generous medical benefits. Overbeck, supra note 44.
The IRS attempts to tax nearly every form of economic benefit flowing to an employee by
reason of the employment relationship except those specifically exempt by law. The Service
claims there is a growing inclination among employees to seek untaxed fringe benefits instead
of additional fully taxed pay increases. Therefore, the future taxability of these traditional
benefits is uncertain.
49. 65 T.C. at 66. The employer's intent determines whether reimbursements are conpensatory. Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1150 (5th Cir. 1971);
Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188, 195 (D. Md. 1967); Humble
Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1353, 1356 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. ,. United States, 442 F.2d 1362, 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
373 F.2d 924, 932 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
50. 434 U.S. at 97.
51. See S. RxP. No. 1622, supra note 32, and Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(2) (1954). The
minority also noted that there now exists an ironic difference in tax treatment accorded to
the paramilitary New Jersey state trooper and federal military personnel, who may exclude
subsistence allowances from gross income. 434 U.S. at 98; see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(b) (1954).
52. Overbeck, supra note 44, at 823.
53. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 32.
54. 434 U.S. at 92.
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the majority opinion in Kowalski, 51 the legislative history of section
119, and the last line of Treasury Regulation 1.119-1(c)(2). The key
issue is whether the cash meal allowance represents compensation
or is truly reimbursement of an expense incurred for the convenience
of the employer." Accordingly, section 119 could be interpreted to
mean that only cash allowances which compensate, rather than
reimburse, must be included in gross income. 7
A five part test could be employed to determine whether a meal
allowance to state troopers 58 may be excluded from gross income
under section 119.
1) There must be an employer-employee relationship.
2) The cash allowance must be for the convenience of the employer. The. taxpayer should have to demonstrate that the meal
allowance is necessary for the trooper to properly perform his duties.
This condition could be satisfied by showing that the reimbursement would permit the officer to remain in his district and on duty
to handle emergencies during meal periods. 0
3) The meal allowance must be considered an expense reimbursement and there must not be any evidence that the allowance
is compensation. The program in Kowalski violated this guideline
in several respects. The meal payments varied with the trooper's
rank. During overtime each trooper received one and a half times
the normal allowance." The state police brochure described the
meal allowance as an additonal item of salary. Further, the police
union and the state negotiated over the amount of the allowance.
To satisfy the third requirement, all troopers should receive the
same reimbursement, which should not exceed amounts actually
expended for meals on the job.
4) Substantiation of meal expenditures must be required. Pa55.

Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, states:
In any case, to avoid the completely unwarranted result of creating a larger exclusion for cash than kind, the meal allowances here would have to be demonstrated
to be necessary to allow respondent "properly to perform his duties." There is not
even a suggestion on this record of any such necessity.
Id. at 95.
56. Morelan v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 879, 884 (D. Minn. 1965), aff'd, 356 F.2d 199
(8th Cir. 1966).
57. Id.
58. See note 66 infra.
59. See note 4 supra.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2).
61. In Ghastin v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 264, 267-68 (1973), the allowance varied based on the
trooper's rank, and he received one and one half times the normal allowance during overtime.
Thus, the Tax Court ruled that this cash allowance was gross income.
62. 434 U.S. at 80.
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trolmen would be obligated to submit expense accounts showing the
sums spent for meals so that no trooper receives an allowance in
excess of the amount spent.63 In Kowalski no documentation of meal
expenditures was required. Thus, the patrolmen did not even have
to spend their cash allowance on meals.
5) The meals must be furnished on the business premises of the
employer.6 ' Troopers would be required to eat their meals in public
restaurants in their patrol area, thereby facilitating their availability to the public.65 If these five guidelines are followed by the state
and the trooper, a cash meal allowance should be excludable from
gross income under section 119.66
63. Using this basic reimbursement system, each trooper would receive the same amount
of money per meal regardless of rank. The trooper would then account to the state regarding

how the meal allowance was spent. If the trooper did not spend the entire allowance, the
balance would be returned to the state.
An alternative plan would be straight reimbursement to troopers for amounts spent on
meals. The weakness in this system is the lack of an upper limit on the amount troopers could
spend. Therefore, the basic reimbursement system is preferable.
64. The question of whether § 119 includes both meals in kind and cash reimbursements
has been the subject of extensive litigation in a series of cases dealing with substantially
similar fact situations. These cases concern state troopers who purchase meals while on duty
and are reimbursed by the state.
In each case the Commissioner's principal argument was that § 119 applied only to meals
furnished in kind and that, in any event, the meals were not furnished on the business
premises of the employer. The courts' decisions have centered on whether the § 119 exclusion
is limited to meals furnished in kind. In Kowalski, once the court determined that meals must
be furnished in kind to be excludable under § 119, it found the consideration of other facts
unnecessary. Therefore, the Kowalski court did not discuss the requirement that meals must
be furnished on the business premises of the employer.
The court in United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963), ruled that meals to
state troopers were furnished on the employer's business premises. It stated "The major
business of this state law enforcement agency is obviously not confined to isolated station
houses; rather it covers every road and highway in the state twenty-four hours a day every
day." Id. at 912.
In Wilson v. United States, 412 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1969), the court took the opposite
position, ruling that the state conducted no business in the public restaurant, where the
officer was eating and he was not performing any business on behalf of the state while he was
eating at the restaurant. Id. at 696.
65. See Tress. Reg. § 1.119-1(c)(1). "For purposes of this section, the term business
premises of the employer generally means the place of employment of the employee." The
state trooper's business premises should be interpreted to include restaurants in his patrol
area. United States v. Morelan, 356 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1966), aff'g 237 F. Supp. 879 (D.
Minn. 1965). The convenience of the employer test is satisfied where an employee must accept
his meals or lodging in order to properly perform his duties. Comm'r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S.
at 93, citing S. Rsp. No. 1622, supra note 32.
These two tests should be distinguished. For example, it may not be convenient to the state
to have troopers eat at headquarters, usually because of the distance a trooper would have to
travel to return there. Thus it is usually more convenient if the trooper takes his meals in or
near his patrol area. If he is outside the patrol area, however, the meal would not be eaten
on the business premises of the employer, although it could still be for the state's convenience.
66. While this analysis has emphasized state troopers, this five step approach can be
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MEAL REIMBURSEMENTS CONSTITUTE WAGES SUBJECT

To

WITHHOLDING

Overview
Under Kowalski, most meal reimbursements should be included
in gross income. This holding magnifies the importance of determining whether these amounts are wages for the purpose of withholding
taxes.67 Under the scheme of withholding taxes, an employer deducts sums calculated to approximate the employee's ultimate tax
liability at the end of the year.68 The concepts of income and wages,
however, are not necessarily coterminus15 Wages usually constitute
income, 0 yet many items qualify as income which are not wages. 7
Nonetheless, to effectuate the purposes of withholding almost any
income which an employee receives from his employer should be
subject to withholding.
Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States72 addressed
the issue of whether meal reimbursements to employees constitute
wages. Internal Revenue Code section 3401(a) defines wages as "all
remuneration for services performed by an employee for his employer.

'73

Although this provision appears straightforward, it has

7
been subject to conflicting interpretation. '
The Treasury Department has linked the employer's withholding
obligation to whether the benefit conferred constitutes gross income
to the employee. 75 Several courts have upheld this broad interpretautilized in any meal reimbursement situation to determine if § 119 will permit the reimbursement to be excluded from gross income.
67. Throughout the remainder of this article, the terms "wages" and "the employer's
withholding obligation" will be used interchangeably. Withholding is required only on wages
defined by the Code. I.R.C. § 3402. I.R.C. § 3401(a) defines as wages "all remuneration (other
than fees paid to a public officer) for services performed by an employee for his employer,
including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other than cash;
68. See notes 101-106 infra and accompanying text.
69. Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. at 25 (1977).
70. There are exceptions to this rule. E.g., I.R.C. § 911(a), excludes from gross income
certain wages earned outside the United States. "Wages" here is used in the non-technical
sense.
71. Examples of items that are income but are not wages include interest, rent, and
dividends.
72. 435 U.S. 21 (1978), revug 540 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'g 405 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.
Ill. 1975).
73. I.R.C. § 3401(a).
74. See, e.g., Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973); Stubbs, Overbeck
& Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 313 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.
Tex. 1970); Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1967);
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref.
Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
75. Treas. Reg, § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(9) provides:
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tion of wages.7" For example, in S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States,"
the employer gave free lunches to employees who ate at the lunch
counter and assisted during busy lunch periods. The Court held that
the value of the free lunches was subject to withholding taxes."
Other cases, however, have distinguished between wages and
employees' income and have applied a much narrower concept of
wages. 7 In Royster Co. v. United States,80 the employer reimbursed
(9) Value of Meals and Lodging. The value of meals and lodging furnished to
an employee by his employer is not subject to withholding if the value of the meals
and lodging is excluded from the gross income of the employee.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(2) provides:
(2) Traveling and other expenses. Amounts paid specifically-either as advances or reimbursements-for traveling or other bona fide ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in the business of the employer are not wages and are not subject
to withholding.
These two regulations tie the employer's withholding obligation to the employee's tax result
in different ways. The former delimits "wages" directly in terms of the employee's gross
income, while the latter excludes from withholding expenses which the employee may deduct
from gross income. Although exclusions and deductions are not the same, they both reduce
the net amount on which the employee pays taxes. See note 19 supra.
The IRS has followed these regulations in several revenue rulings. In Revenue Ruling 7085, advice was requested whether withholding of income tax was required with respect to
amounts paid to members of the state police as reimbursements for the cost of meals while
on daily patrol duty and not in a travel status. The Treasury Department, relying on Regulation § 31.3401(a)-l(b)(9), and decisions that meal reimbursements are gross income, ruled
that these reimbursements constituted wages subject to withholding for tax purposes. In
Revenue Ruling 75-279, the Treasury Department stated amounts given to an employee as
meal allowances are wages subject to withholding, if the employee is not away from home
overnight and does not account to his employer for expenses.
76. Educational Fund of the Elec. Indus. v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1970); Campbell Sash Works, Inc. v. United States, 217
F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1963). The court in Campbell ruled that an expense paid vacation
for employees was subject to withholding tax, even though the employees performed no
services while on vacation. In EducationalFund, the fund made payments to electricians to
attend a one week course in civics. The payments were part of a total benefit package
negotiated by the union. Accordingly, they represented a portion of the agreed remuneration.
The court found that these payments were wages within § 3401(a). 305 F. Supp. at 320.
77. 379 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1967).
78. Id. at 310. The value of these meals was not excludable from gross income because
employees had the option of taking them. See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(d).
Kresge can be distinguished from Central Illinois Public Service. In Kresge, the employees
were under a duty to perform services as called upon during their lunch hour. In contrast,
the CentralIllinois employees were not expected to and did not in fact perform services during
their lunch hours. See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
79. Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973); Stubbs, Overbeck &
Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g 313 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Tex.
1970); Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1967); Humble
Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. United
States, 442 F.2d 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 924 (Ct.
Cl. 1967).
In Stubbs, the court ruled that per diem payments given to employees as a living allowance
were not wages. "In order to be wages, the payments must be made for services performed."
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salesmen for the cost of meals they purchased while on the road,
even though the employees were not away from home overnight. The
salesmen performed no duties for the employer during the meals.
Hence, the Royster Court held that these reimbursements were not
remuneration for services performed, and therefore were not wages."
CentralIllinois Public Service presented the Supreme Court with
its first opportunity to consider the relationship between the employer's withholding obligation and the employee's gross income. In
granting certiorari, the Court recognized a conflict between the
Royster decison in the Fourth Circuit and Central Illinois Public
Service in the Seventh. 2 The Court's decision, however, did not
clearly resolve the conflict" nor did it develop standards for determining what constitutes wages in the employment setting. 8
Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States
Factual Background
In 1963, the Central Illinois Public Service Co. reimbursed employees for reasonable expenses incurred in non-overnight travel on
company business. This allowance included payments for meals in
an amount not to exceed one dollar and forty cents per meal. An
employee was entitled to the allowance even if he brought his own
lunch from home. Although the employee rendered no services to
Central Illinois during his lunch period, the company considered the
payment beneficial to its business interests." In an audit conducted
Viewing the matter from the employer's purpose in making the payments, these payments
were ordinary and necessary business expenses and were not intended to be compensation
for services performed. 445 F.2d at 1149.
The court in Humble Oil decided that reimbursements by a corporation for moving expenses of its existing employees did not constitute wages for services performed. This court also
looked at the employer's purpose for making the payments and determined they were not
compensation subject to withholding taxes. 442 F.2d at 1369.
80. 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973).
81. Id. at 392. Although wages subject to withholding may be narrower than gross income,
anything which constitutes "wages" should be gross income to the employee. See note 99
infra. The court in Royster noted that case law had rejected a theory of complete congruence
between sections governing employees' tax liabilities, and those determining the employer's
withholding obligations. Id. at 388-89. The government had contended, nonetheless, that nondeductibility of the expenses indicated that the reimbursements were wages subject to withholding. The court rejected that argument, however, and essentially denied the existence of
any relation between the two concepts. Id. at 390.
82. 435 U.S. at 24.
83. See notes 108-114 infra and accompanying text.
84. The Court did state, however, that "wages" is a narrower concept than "income." 435
U.S. at 29.
85. Id. at 23. This lunch payment arrangement saved the company employee time other.
wise spent in traveling back and forth from work. It also saved the company travel expenses.
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in 1971, the Internal Revenue Service took the position that the
lunch reimbursements made in 1963 qualified as wages subject to
withholding. Central Illinois paid the deficiency, and filed a claim
for refund of the total amount paid.
The District Court and the Quid Pro Quo Test
The district court held that these mbal reimbursements were not
wages under section 3401(a), and therefore were not subject to withholding."6 The government argued that the definition of wages
should include any payment attributable to the employment relationship. The court, however, explained that such a sweeping definition is too broad since wages is a narrower term than income.8 7 In
the court's view, wages are only those payments which are received
as a quid pro quo for particular services performed by an employee
for his employer.8 Since the employees did not perform any services
during their lunch hours, the reimbursements were not wages."
The quid pro quo approach seems inconsistent with the purposes
of withholding. Congress designed withholding to collect, concurrently with the receipt of income, the tax which an employee would
eventually owe on that income. Under Kowalski certain meal reimbursements must be included in gross income.9 Under the district
court's opinion in Central Illinois Public Service, however, reimbursements which do not compensate for a specific service, are not
subject to withholding. Thus, the quid pro quo approach results in
employee income which is subject to taxation but not to withholding. " Hence, this approach will cause a disparity to arise between
total tax liability and tax already collected at the end of the year."
86.

405 F. Supp. 748, 749. The court relied on Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387

(4th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
87. 405 F. Supp. at 749.
88. Id.
89. Id. The court would have had to "[depart] from the realities of business life and
[stretch the statute] to try to include the lunch payments as being for services rendered to
the company." See also Note, Taxation-EmployerReimbursements not Subject to F.I.C.A.,
F. U.T.A., and Income Tax Withholding, 10 WAKE FOREST L. RE. 651 (1974); Overbeck, supra
note 44, at 824. Both articles affirm the proposition that since the employees did not perform
and were not expected to perform any services while eating, the payments could not constitute wages as they were not made in return for services rendered.
90. Note, Withholding Tax on Wages: Central Illinois PublicService Co. v. United States,
29 MAINE L. REv. 401, 410 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Withholding Tax on Wages].
See also, S. REP. No. 221, 78th Cong., 1st SESS. reprinted in 1943 C.B. 1314 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 221]; H.R. REP. No. 401, 78th Cong., 1st SEss., reprinted
in 1943 C.B. 1283 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 401]. Both of these reports prescribe
the pay-as-you-go system for current collection of withholding taxes.
91. 434 U.S. 77, 84 (1977). See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text.
92. Note, Withholding Tax on Wages, supra note 90 at 410.
93. Id. The quid pro quo approach aggravates the existing gap between an employee's
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Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and adopted an
expansive definition of wages."' The court ruled that the meal allowance constituted remuneration for services performed by Central
Illinois employees. The treasury regulations support this expansive
definition." They make clear that neither the name by which remuneration is designated, nor the manner in which it is paid, is a
material factor in determining whether the payments constitute
wages. The court evaluated the reimbursement policy in the context
of the total relationship that Central Illinois maintained with its
employees. 6 The payments were viewed as part of a total package
of remuneration given in exchange for the employees' services. 7
Therefore, the reimbursements were wages subject to withholding
for tax purposes."
The total package approach used by the Seventh Circuit causes
all employee income arising from the employment relationship to be
considered wages." This expansive definition of wages is supported
by the legislative history of section 3401.100 In adopting withholding,
Congress established a pay-as-you-go system of taxation.' 0 ' Under
income and wages. Kovey, Impact of Supreme Court Decision Limiting Withholding on
Employees' Meal Allowances, 48 J. TAx. 276 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kovey]. Withholding assures the Treasury more revenue and easier collection, and may also benefit the taxpayer by preventing large tax payments due at one time. In theory, though, taxpayers might
prefer less withholding because they retain the use of their money throughout the year.
94. 540 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1976).
95. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-i (1954). Other sources support the concept that the term
wages should be broadly interpreted to successfully accomplish the purposes of withholding.
See, e.g., Educational Fund of the Elec. Ind. v. United States, 426 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1970),
aff'g 305 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Campbell Sash Works, Inc. v. United States, 217 F.
Supp. 74 (N.D. Ohio 1963); Note, Taxation-Employer Reimbursements not Subject to
F.I.C.A., F. U TA., and Income Tax Withholding, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 654 (1974);
Note, Withholding Tax on Wages, supra note 90 at 406.
96. 540 F.2d at 302. This test is very different from the quid pro quo model used by the
district court.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 303.
99. Id. In Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1973), the government had
originally contended that all payments to an employee were wages. This model would probably be over inclusive. The government later withdrew this contention and in Central Illinois
Public Service conceded that not all payments to employees are wages.
Only those payments by an employer to an employee that are includible in the employee's
gross income should be subject to withholding tax. For example, since annuities, health and
accident insurance payments, and unemployment benefits are excludable from gross income
these payments are also excluded from withholding taxes. See the Current Tax Payment Act
of 1943, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126; H.R. REP. No. 401, supra note 90.
100. 540 F.2d at 302; Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126.
101. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126; S.REP. No. 221, supra note
90; H.R. REP. No. 401, supra note 90.
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this system, the individual pays tax on a current basis and avoids
the burden of making large tax payments at one time.'"2 The Treasury also benefits because the scheme provides greater assurance of
collecting taxes from the employee. 0 3 This collection feature suggests that wages subject to withholding should include all sums
which will determine the employee's ultimate tax liability."4 Further, the first withholding provisions required employers to withhold to the extent that wages were includible in the employee's gross
income. 05 Thus, the purposes of withholding mandate congruence
between wages and gross income derived from the employment relation. 06
The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court focused on two major issues: (1) the relationship between income and wages; and (2) the potential retroactive
effect of its decision. With respect to the first matter, the Court
adopted neither the quid pro quo model of the district court, nor the
totality approach of the Seventh Circuit.'"7 Rather, it reversed the
Seventh Circuit, and held that "wages" is a narrower concept than
gross income. 08 The government argued the totality approach, and
claimed that section 61(a)(1) and section 3401 have equivalent
scopes. 091 The Court rejected this as a "rather facile conclusion."','
The Court explained that an expansive definition of wages is inconsistent with the withholding system."' Congress chose simplic102. Note, Withholding Tax on Wages, supra note 90, at 404.
103. The Treasury is guarded against deaths, disappearances, and insolvencies, as well
as simple failures to pay.
104. Note, Withholding Tax on Wages, supra note 90, at 405; H.R. REP. No. 510, 78th
Cong., 1st SEss., reprinted in 1943 C.B. 1351.
105. The Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 added a new Sub-chapter D, Collection of
Income Tax at Source on Wages, to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126.
106. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 172, 56 Stat. 887.
107. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Kowalski in tandem with the arguments
in Central Illinois Public Service on October 12, 1977. The question of the includibility of
these meal reimbursements in gross income was not before the Court in CentralIllinois P~iblic
Service.
108. 435 U.S. at 29.
109. Id. at 28, citing, Brief for United States at 15. The government argued in effect that
in the employment context, gross income is equivalent to wages.
110. Id. at 29. "Considerations that support subjectability to the income tax are not
necessarily the same as the considerations that support withholding. To require the employee
to carry the risk of his own tax liability is not the same as to require the employer to carry
the risk of the tax liability of its employee. Required withholding, therefore, is rightly much
narrower than subjectability to income taxation." Id.
111. Id. at 31. The Court rejected totally an automatic correlation between income and
wages and found irrelevant gross income and Social Security cases defining "wages." Id. at
28-29. See Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974); Comm'r v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956);
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ity, ease of administration, and circumscription of the wage concept
as the standard for the withholding system. 2 This standard was
intentionally narrow and precise.113 Consequently, the employer's
obligation to withhold should not be speculative as it was in this
situation." 4
The possible retroactive effect of a determination adverse to the
taxpayer was a significant factor in the Court's decision." 5 Central
Illinois provided the meal reimbursements in 1963. The Court observed that no employer at that time had reason to believe meal
allowances were wages subject to withholding. "' In 1963, it was even
questionable whether meal reimbursements were includible in the
employee's gross income."' Since the tax status of these meal reimbursements was uncertain, the Court refused to impose a withholding obligation on Central Illinois."8
The Court's refusal to apply this retroactive liability had three
bases. First, this application would have been contrary to congressional intent expressed in amendments to the withholding provisions. "1 Adjustments in the withholding tax provisions have always
been imposed prospectively as a*matter of equity and custom. 2 1'
Second, retroactive assessments should be limited to cases where
the Commissioner seeks to correct a mistake of law, not where the
employer did not know and had no reason to know of the withholding obligation.21 Finally, if withholding taxes could be assessed retSocial Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279
U.S. 716 (1929).
112. 435 U.S. at 31. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sass., 1942.
113. 435 U.S. at 31.
114. Id. See notes 115-124 infra. See also H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 1st SESs., 1976;
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v; United States, 442 F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
115. Kovey, supra note 93.
116. 435 U.S. at 32. There was no indication in the Internal Revenue Code, the Treasury
Regulations or Revenue Rulings that meal allowances might constitute wages.
117. United States v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963); Saunders v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d
768 (3d Cir. 1954). Both of these cases ruled that meal allowances were not includible in gross
income. Only with the Correll decision, in 1967, was there a ruling of nondeductibility for
these meal expenditures.
118. An employer will be found liable only if his obligation to withhold is precise. 435 U.S.
at 31. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. United States, 442 F.2d 1362, 1369-70 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
See also H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 1st Sass. (1976).
119. 435 U.S. at 34-35 (Brennan, J., concurring); Kovey, supra note 93 at 277.
120. 435 U.S. at 36-37 (Brennan, J., concurring). The 1976 Tax Reform Act's adjustments
to the withholding provisions inadvertently were not made prospective. This was corrected
by § 404 of the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977. See also 435 U.S. at 35 n.4,
(Brennan, J., concurring); S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st SEss. 186 (1977).
121. 435 U.S. at 34 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). "In the field of fringe benefit taxation,
therefore the fact that something is taxed today that was not taxed yesterday is not so much
evidence of mistake corrected as of an evolving understanding of what changed circumstan-
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roactively, employers would effectively be made guarantors of their
employees' tax liabilities.' The legislative history of the Internal
Revenue Code reveals no such congressional intent. 2 3 Therefore, the
Court concluded that retroactive24application of withholding taxes
would be an abuse of discretion.
Observations on Central Illinois Public Service
The Supreme Court in Central Illinois Public Service held that
in 1963 the applicable rules and regulations did not require income
tax withholding on meal reimbursements. Although Central Illinois
Public Service supports a narrower construction for wages than for
income, it does not indicate which reimbursements constitute remuneration for services rendered. 2 Thus, the impact of the decision on
meal reimbursements is unclear. Certainly, the decision restricts
the Treasury Department's liberal interpretation of "wages." The
Court's emphasis on the effect of a retroactive imposition of withholding implies that an identical case arising today might be decided differently.
In 1963, courts ruled that taxpayers could either exclude meal
reimbursements 26 or deduct meal expenses'2 from gross income.'
Without an indication that these reimbursements were income to
the employee, no employer could possibly have foreseen that he
should withhold taxes on them. 29 Since 1963, however, notions of
gross income and business deductions have changed. Under
CorrellI" and Kowalski meal expenses are not deductible and meal
reimbursements are not excludable from gross income.' 3 ' Thus, between 1963 and the present, the concept of the ultimate basis of an
employee's tax liability, his income, has expanded. By employing a
narrow definition of wages, the Court in Central Illinois Public
ces, equity, and legislative purpose require." Id. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68
(1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
122. 435 U.S. at 34 (Brennan, J., concurring). The concurring opinion states further, "it
is possible that the employer could sue each of his employees to recover the amount of
withholding taxes retroactively assessed by the government. The chance that such a method
of recovery would be either practical or cost effective is remote, however." Id. at 34 n.3.
123. Id. at 34.
124. Id. at 32 n.12, 34 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Kovey, supra note 93 at 278.
126. U.S. v. Barrett, 321 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1963); Saunders v. Comm'r, 215 F.2d 768 (3d
Cir. 1954) (used 1939 Code).
127. Hanson v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
128. See note 19 supra.
129. See notes 115-124 supra and accompanying text.
130. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
131. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
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Service implied that this change should have no effect on the withholding obligation. 32
This implication creates a conflict with certain treasury regulations which tie wages to the employee's income. 33 The Court did not
address this conflict since its decision was based primarily on the
specificity of an employer's withholding obligation as it existed in
1963. To maintain consistency, the Court might find these regulations invalid because they conflict with the withholding statute as
interpreted in Central Illinois Public Service. If the Court were to
void these regulations, however, Congress could still expand the
definition of wages to include meal reimbursements.' 3
IMPACT OF Kowalski AND Central Illinois Public Service ON FRINGE
BENEFITS

Considered together, Kowalski and CentralIllinoisPublic Service
will usually require that meal reimbursements be included in gross
income, yet employers need not withhold taxes on these amounts.
However, the decisions have a broader impact. Each case has affected the taxability of fringe benefits other than meal reimbursements.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Kowalski, the Internal Revenue Service intensified its efforts to tax fringe benefits.' 35 Although
Kowalski involved a cash allowance, the Service used language in
the decision to subject non-cash benefits to taxation. 3 ' The majority
opinion in Kowalski provides strong support for the view that the
concept of gross income has a broad sweep and includes most types
132. 435 U.S. at 39 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The so-called overnight rule of United States v. Correll has nothing whatever to do
with the definition of... "wages." It is exclusively concerned with what deductions employees may take when they prepare their own tax returns.
. . .The importation of the Correll rule into this case can do nothing, therefore,
but confuse the issues actually before us.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. See note 75 supra.
134. Congress may subject meal reimbursements to withholding by expanding the definition of wages, but it has not done so yet. 435 U.S. at 33.
135. Scharff, The Battle Over Taxing Fringe Benefits, MONEY, Oct. 1978 [hereinafter
cited as Scharff]. This is not to imply that the government was not interested in taxing fringe
benefits before Kowalski, only that after Kowalski the IRS interest in taxing the receipt of
fringe benefits became even more intense.
136. The IRS is attempting to use the Kowalski decision which involves cash benefits as
a basis to increase its attack on the taxability of non-cash benefits. Overbeck, supra note 44
at 827-28. Examples of non-cash benefits are railroad and airline passes, free nursery care for
children, auto salesmen who have personal use of a demonstrator model, executive dining
rooms, and medical benefits.
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of fringe benefits.'37 The Service has indicated that most fringe benefits, whether in cash or in kind, should be taxed unless specifically
38
excluded by statute.'
Congress responded to the Internal Revenue Service's position by
passing the Fringe Benefits Act.' 3 9 Section One of the Act prohibits
the Treasury Department from proposing or issuing prior to 1980
regulations governing the includibility of fringe benefits in gross
income.' 40 Congress conceded that section 61 is broad enough to
include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred upon the employee as compensation.'4 ' Nevertheless, Congress recognized that in actual practice this "economic benefit" test
has not been broadly construed.'
Thus, the Fringe Benefits Act
exhibits Congressional concern over the Internal Revenue Service's
increased enforcement activity in the fringe benefits area.
The Act gives Congress time to study and construct specific
guidelines for the taxability of fringe benefits. Congress and the
Treasury Department have each formed committees to examine and
make recommendations concerning the tax treatment of fringe benefits.4 3 Certainly, any new legislation on fringe benefits should define precisely which benefits are includible in gross income and
which are not.' The Treasury Department has warned that if Congress fails to act decisively, the Department will be ready to take
tough measures in 1980.'11
The CentralIllinois Public Service decision, unlike Kowalski, has
hindered the Internal Revenue Service's enforcement activities in
the fringe benefits area. Central Illinois Public Service supports a
137. Stechel, Effect of Recent Supreme Court Decisions on Use of Meals and Lodging
Exclusions, 20 TAX. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 216 (1978)'. The Kowalski decision promotes an expansive interpretation of gross income. See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
138. Scharff, supra note 135.
139. Fringe Benefits Act, PuB. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996 (1978).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. As a result, there has been an inevitable lack of uniformity of treatment of
taxpayers who receive different types of benefits even though the benefits may have approximately the same economic value.
143. Chairman Al Ullman of the House Ways and Means Committee has appointed a
special task force to study the tax treatment of employee fringe benefits. In addition, Donald
Lubick, Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy, initiated a joint Internal Revenue
Service-Treasury Department study on fringe benefits. J. J. Pickle, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee Task Force on Fringe Benefits, has proposed safe harbor legislation which would allow most existing benefits that have gone untaxed to remain that way
but preventing their proliferation. Scharff, supra note 135.
144. Other problems facing Congress are which non-cash benefits provided to employees
are wages subject to withholding taxes, and how to value benefits provided in-kind.
145. Scharff, supra note 135.
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definition of wages narrower than the concept of income. Under the
decision, meal reimbursements as well as other fringe benefits includible in gross income, might not constitute wages subject to withholding. Thus, the decision blunts the Internal Revenue Service's
attempt to use the withholding system as the spearhead of its attack
on fringe benefits."' Congress may, however, reduce this obstacle to
enforcement. The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee
for the Fringe Benefits Act exhibits Congressional awareness of the
need for guidelines providing uniformity in the wage area.
Finally, equitable considerations arising in CentralIllinoisPublic
Service and Kowzlski suggest that limitations should be imposed on
retroactive treatnent in future fringe benefits legislation.'4 7 A principle reason for the decision in Central Illinois Public Service was
the Court's desire to relieve the employer from inadvertent retroactive liability."' Congress has also registered its disapproval of retroactive tax liability. After Kowalski, the Internal Revenue Service
attempted to collect back-taxes from state troopers. In section three
of the Fringe Benefits Act Congress prohibited the Service from
retroactively applying Kowalski."I Similarly, any future fringe benefits legislation or rulings by the Treasury Department should be
solely prospective.150
CONCLUSION

Kowalski held that cash meal reimbursements for non-overnight
travel were includible in gross income. The decision provided a
146. Kovey, supra note 93, at 276. There are several reasons why an expansive interpretation of withholding is preferable. The Treasury is assured of more revenue since it is guarded
against deaths, disappearances, and insolvencies. When employers are required to withhold
taxes, collection is more efficient because the IRS does not have to depend on each employee
to report his taxable reimbursement on his return. An expansive interpretation is also favorable to an employee since it allows him to avoid the burden of making large tax payments at
one time.
147. Kovey, supra note 93, at 279.
148. 435 U.S. at 37 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court reasoned, "that additional
withholding taxes should not at least without good reason be assessed against employers who
did not know of and who had no reason to know of increased withholding obligations at the
time wages had to be withheld." Id. See note 121 supra.
149. The only reason given for this position is that Congress believes that the Kowalski
decision should not be applied on a retroactive basis. Fringe Benefits Act, PuB. L. No. 95427, 92 Stat. 996 (1978). The Act excludes from gross income all statutory subsistence allowances received by state police officers, through 1977.
150. Kovey, supra note 93 at 279; Smith, "Independent Contractor" or "Employee"?
That is the Question, 33 N.Y.U. ANN. INsT. ON FED. TAx. 577 (1975). See Treas. Reg. §
301.7805-1(b) (1960) which states, "[Tihe Secretary, may prescribe the extent, if any, to
which any ruling or regulation or Treasury decision relating to the internal revenue laws
shall be applied without retroactive effect." Lenient use should be made of this regulation
until precise guidelines are formed.
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broad interpretation of income and construed the meal exclusion
narrowly. In Central Illinois Public Service the Court ruled that
similar meal allowances did not constitute wages subject to withholding. This results in confining the concept of wages to limits
narrower than notions of gross income.
The effect of the two decisions is that meal reimbursements are
generally taxable to the employee, yet his employer is not required
to withhold taxes on them. This anomalous combination impedes
enforcement and tends to place a greater tax burden on the employee at the end of the year. Further, the narrow concept of wages
fails to effectuate the purposes of the withholding system and is
symptomatic of a general lack of standards in the fringe benefits
area.
To achieve clarity and equality in the taxation of fringe benefits,
Congress should devise specific guidelines. Any new legislation
should define which benefits constitute gross income and which do
not. Then, Congress should expand the definition of wages to include those fringe benefits which also constitute gross income. 5 ' If
gross income is well defined, the simplest way to determine the
employer's withholding obligation will be to equate wages with employee gross income.
151.

The Court notes the availability of this option at 435 U.S. at 33.
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